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Abstract
We show that, under a standard hardness assumption, there is no computationally effi-
cient algorithm that given n samples from an unknown distribution can give valid answers
to n3+o(1) adaptively chosen statistical queries. A statistical query asks for the expectation
of a predicate over the underlying distribution, and an answer to a statistical query is valid
if it is “close” to the correct expectation over the distribution.
Our result stands in stark contrast to the well known fact that exponentially many
statistical queries can be answered validly and efficiently if the queries are chosen non-
adaptively (no query may depend on the answers to previous queries). Moreover, a recent
work [DFH+14] shows how to accurately answer exponentially many adaptively chosen sta-
tistical queries via a computationally inefficient algorithm; and how to answer a quadratic
number of adaptive queries via a computationally efficient algorithm. The latter result im-
plies that our result is tight up to a linear factor in n.
Conceptually, our result demonstrates that achieving statistical validity alone can be
a source of computational intractability in adaptive settings. For example, in the mod-
ern large collaborative research environment, data analysts typically choose a particular
approach based on previous findings. False discovery occurs if a research finding is sup-
ported by the data but not by the underlying distribution. While the study of preventing
false discovery in Statistics is decades old, to the best of our knowledge our result is the first
to demonstrate a computational barrier. In particular, our result suggests that the perceived
difficulty of preventing false discovery in today’s collaborative research environment may
be inherent.
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1 Introduction
Empirical research is commonly done by testing multiple hypotheses on a finite sample. A test
outcome is deemed statistically signficant if it is unliked to have occured by chance alone. False
discovery arises if the analyst incorrectly declares an observation as statistically significant.
For decades statisticians have been devising methods for preventing false discovery, such as
the widely used and highly influential method for controlling the false discovery rate due to
Benjamini and Hochberg [BH95].
Nevertheless the problem of false discovery persists across all empirical sciences today.
Popular articles report on an increasing number of invalid research findings. Why is it seem-
ingly so difficult to prevent false discovery? Today’s practice of data analysis diverges from
classical statistics in its massive scale, heavy use of sophisticated algorithms, and large number
of participants in any given project. Importantly, the way modern data analysts interact with
the data set is inherently adaptive—many design choices, including the choice and tuning of
the algorithm itself, depend on previous interactions with the data set. An extreme example
are data science competitions, in which hundreds of data scientists analyze the same data set
and repeatedly evaluate their approach against the same data. This level of adaptivity makes
it nearly impossible to give a precise a priori description of the experimental setup.
We formalize the way in which data analysts may interact with a data set using the statistical-
query model (SQ model) of Kearns [Kea93]. In the statistical query model, there is an algorithm
called the oracle that gets access to n samples from an unknown distributionD over some finite
universe X . We will assume throughout that X = {0,1}d where we think of the parameter d as
the dimensionality of the data. A statistical query q is specified by a predicate p : X → {0,1}
and the answer to a statistical query is defined as q(D) = Ex∼D p(x). The goal of the oracle is to
give an answer a to the query that is accurate (or statistically valid) in the sense that |a−q(D)| ≤ α
with high probability. Throughout our work we only require α to be a small constant. Put
differently, the goal of the oracle is to provide answers that generalize to the underlying distri-
bution rather than answers that are specific to the sample. The latter is always easy to achieve
by outputting the empirical average of the query predicate on the sample.
The SQ model has a number of advantages for our purposes. First, almost all natural ma-
chine learning algorithms can be compiled into a sequence of statistical queries. Hence, the
model does not give up much generality. Second, it makes it convenient to formalize adaptiv-
ity. In the adaptive/interactive setting, the analyst is modeled as an efficient algorithm that
given a sequence of queries and answers q1, a1,q2, a2, . . . , qi , ai (previously exchanged with the
oracle) produces a new query qi+1. We say that an oracle is accurate given n samples for k adap-
tively chosen queries, if for every distribution D, given n samples from D the oracle accurately
responds to any computationally efficient adaptive analyst that makes at most k queries. A
computationally efficient oracle should run time polynomial in n and d on input of each query.
A recent work by Dwork, Feldman, Hardt, Pitassi, Reingold and Roth [DFH+14] addresses
the problem of answering adaptive statistical queries. Their main result implies that there is
a computationally inefficient oracle that accurately answers even an exponential number of
adaptively chosen statistical queries. Moreover, they show that a quadratic number of queries
can be answered accurately and efficiently. Our main theorem shows that these results are
essentially as far as it goes. Under a standard cryptographic hardness assumption, we show
that there is no efficient oracle that is accurate on more than a cubic number of adaptively
chosen queries.
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Theorem 1.1. Assuming one-way functions exist, there is no computationally efficient oracle that
given n samples is accurate on n3+o(1) adaptively chosen queries.
An intuitive interpretation of the theorem is that if an efficient oracle attempts to answer
more than n3 statistical queries it cannot in general maintain that its answers are statistically
valid with respect to the underlying distribution. Of course, the oracle can always report the
exact answer of the query on its data set. However, this strategy does not maintain accuracy on
adaptive queries in general and—as our theorem shows—neither does any other computation-
ally efficient approach. From a technical perspective our result gives a strong computational
lower bound in the statistical query model. Lower bounds in the statistical query model have
been studied for more than two decades. But more broadly speaking, we interpret our result
as pointing at an inherent computational obstruction to preventing false discovery in collabo-
rative science.
Note that Theorem 1.1 stands in sharp contrast to the non-adaptive setting. If we fix queries
q1, . . . , qk and then sample n items from the distribution D, the observed empirical answer to
each query on the data set will be close to the correct answer with high probability so long as
k = 2o(n). This guarantee follows from a Hoeffding bound together with the union bound.
Our hardness result applies when the dimensionality of the data grows with the sample size
more than logarithmically so that 2d is no longer polynomial in n.1 This requirement is rather
mild, and is also necessary. If n  2d then the empirical distribution of the n samples will
be close to the underlying distribution in statistical distance, and thus every statistical query
can be answered accurately given the sample. More generally, as we discuss in Section 1.2,
there are algorithms that run in time polynomial in n and 2d and provide accuracy even on
an exponential number of adaptively chosen queries [DFH+14]. Thus, our results show that
the dimensionality of the data has a major effect on the hardness of the problem. In fact, we
provide a second theorem that shows that if the dimensionality is polynomially large in n, then
we cannot even hope for a computationally unbounded oracle that provides accuracy on adaptive
queries.
Theorem 1.2. There is no computationally unbounded oracle that given n samples of dimension
d = n3+o(1) is accurate on n3+o(1) adaptively chosen queries.
While the dimension in the previous theorem has to be large, there are important data sets
that exhibit this trade-off between sample size and dimension. A good example are genome
wide association studies (GWAS). Here, the sample size corresponds to patients with a certain
(possibly rare disease) and is often in the hundreds. The dimensionality corresponds to the
number of relevent positions in the human genome and is often in the millions. Moreover, the
genome resolution is increasing rapidly with new technology whereas the number of available
patients is not.
Conclusion. To conclude this discussion of our results, we believe that adaptivity is an essen-
tial element of modern data analysis that ought to be taken into account by theoretical models.
At the same time, our theorems demonstrate the intrinsic difficulty of coping with adaptivity.
1This is under the stronger but standard assumption that exponentially hard one-way-functions exist.
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1.1 Proof overview
The intuition for our proof is rather simple. We will design a challenge distribution D and
a computationally efficient adaptive analyst A so that the following is true. If any compua-
tionally efficient oracle O is given n samples S = {x1, . . . ,xn} drawn from D then our adaptive
analyst A is able to reconstruct n′ = n −O(1) samples {y1, . . . , yn′ } ⊆ S. In other words, the an-
alyst is able to find all but a constant number of samples that the oracle is using. While the
analyst has a priori information about the distribution D it has no information whatsoever
about which sample O received. Nevertheless, the analyst can reconstruct essentially all of
the hidden sample. Quantitatively, the analyst proceeds in n −O(1) rounds and each round
consists of roughly n2 queries. In each round the analyst successfully recovers one data item
from the oracle provided that the oracle continues to give accurate answers. After the analyst
has recovered almost all samples, the effective sample size of the oracle has shrunk down to a
constant size. At this point it is easy for the analyst to find queries on which the oracle gives
blatantly inaccurate answers.
The first problem is to recover even a single data point inside the oracle’s sample. To solve
this problem we rely on a cryptographic primitive known as a fingerprinting code. Fingerprint-
ing codes were introduced by Boneh and Shaw [BS98] for the problem of watermarking digital
content. A fingerprinting code has two components. The first component generates a set of
“challenge queries.” The second component is a “tracing algorithm” which takes answers to
these queries and returns a data item. The fingerprinting code gives the guarantee that if the
challenge queries are answered accurately, and by looking only at how each challenge query is
defined on S, then the tracing algorithm will successfully recover one element in S. Unfortu-
nately, in general nothing prevents the oracle from evaluating the queries at points outside of S.
In fact, information-theoretically the challenge queries used in our attack reveal information
about the unknown distribution D that the oracle didn’t have previously. Evaluating the query
outside the sample S is somewhat unnatural. For example, if the oracle simply outputs an em-
pirical quantity that only depends on the sample this situation will not arise. For such natural
oracles our proof is somewhat easier and does not require any cryptographic assumptions. We
therefore present this illustrative special case in Section 3.
To obtain a result for all computationally bounded oracles, we need to hide from the oracle
the additional information that’s revealed by the query definition outside the sample. To do
so, we use an encryption scheme to effectively hide the definition of the query on points out-
side of S from the oracle. The encryption is sufficient to show that, assuming that the oracle
is computationally bounded, the tracing algorithm of the fingerprinting code will succeed. We
note that encryption schemes suitable for our purpose exist under the standard assumption
that one-way functions exist. With this one-round approach in mind, we can proceed itera-
tively. In the next round we exclude the previously learned data item from the definition of
the challenge queries, which ensures that the analyst learns a new item in each round.
There is one important subtlety. The tracing algorithm of the fingerprinting code will only
succeed if the oracle answers the challenge queries accurately with respect to its sample S.
However, our assumption is that the oracle is accurate with respect to the underlying distribu-
tionD rather than the sample S.We need to worry that eventually the sample and the distribu-
tion disagree on the challenge queries. In this case the oracle may be inaccurate on its sample
(and hence tracing fails), yet still accurate on the distribution. To rule out this pathological sit-
uation we use a measure concentration property of our specific choice of fingerprinting code.
Specifically, we the fact that the challenge queries of the code are essentially random predicates
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with a certain bias. This property allows us to use the randomness of the challenge queries to
argue that the sample S approximately agrees with the distribution D on these queries with
sufficiently high probability so long as there are at least O(1) elements in the sample that we
haven’t reconstructed yet. Due to the approximation error incurred here, we also need to use
a somewhat stronger primitive called a robust fingerprinting code that was just recently pro-
vided in work by Bun, Ullman and Vadhan [BUV14], which also satisfies the necessary measure
concentration property.
1.2 Connection to privacy and reconstruction attacks
Our work builds on a close connection to the problem of designing privacy-preserving oracles.
Here, the goal is to provide answers to statistical queries in such a way that the analyst does
not learn the specifics of individual data records but rather global properties of the underlying
distribution. A successful approach for formalizing this desideratum is the notion of differen-
tial privacy [DMNS06]. Differential privacy requires that the answers given by the oracle are
randomized in such a way that the presence or absence of any single data item in the sample
cannot be detected. It is known that differential privacy prevents so-called reconstruction at-
tacks. A reconstruction attack is an algorithm that is able to reconstruct most entries of a data
set by interacting with the oracle. Such an attack demonstrates that the oracle is blatantly non-
private (it fails to satisfy not only differential privacy, but any reasonable notion of privacy).
Our work can be considered an efficient reconstruction attack as we give an efficient adaptive
analyst that reconstructs almost all of the data points that the oracle uses if the oracle provides
accuracy on n3+o(1) queries. An immediate consequence of our work is therefore the following
result.
Theorem 1.3. Assuming one-way functions exist, any computationally efficient oracle that given n
samples is accurate on n3+o(1) adaptively chosen queries must be blatantly non-private.
This result should be compared with recent work of Ullman [Ull13], which showed that or-
acles satisfying differential privacy cannot answer even n2+o(1) non-adaptively chosen queries.
Here we show that if the queries are chosen adaptively, then the same conclusion holds even
for oracles that merely thwart blatant non-privacy, up to a factor of n loss in the number of
queries.
An important difference to the privacy setting is how accuracy is defined. In the privacy
setting, accuracy is defined with respect to the oracle’s sample. It is trivial to maintain accu-
racy with respect to the sample by answering each query with the sample mean, which suc-
ceeds even when the oracle is blatantly non-private. In the setting of false discovery, we define
accuracy with respect to the underlying distribution and show that achieving this notion of
accuracy is hard for the oracle.
Upper bounds for answering adaptive queries. Differential privacy is also useful in estab-
lishing upper bounds in our setting. At a high-level, differential privacy is a stability con-
dition on an algorithm requiring that the output varies only slightly with the addition or
deletion of a sample point. On the other hand, it is known that stability implies general-
ization [BE02]. Hence, we can think of the interaction between an oracle and an analyst as
a single algorithm that satisfies a stability guarantee strong enough to imply generalization
bounds with respect to the underlying distribution. This approach was formalized by Dwork
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et al. [DFH+14] leading to upper bounds in the adaptive setting when combined with algo-
rithms from the differential privacy literature. Specifically, work of Roth-Roughgarden [RR10]
and Hardt-Rothblum [HR10] addresses differential privacy in the interactive setting. The latter
work shows that 2Ω˜(n/
√
d) statistical queries can be answered with constant error under differ-
ential privacy. However, the running time is exponential in d. Using the results of [DFH+14]
this leads to the same upper bound in the adaptive statistical query setting. Similarly, there
is an efficient differentially private mechanism that gives constant accuracy for Ω˜(n2) queries.
This leads to a computationally efficient upper bound in our setting. To summarize we state
the following theorem.
Theorem 1.4 ([DFH+14]). There is an inefficient algorithm that accurately answers 2Ω˜(n/
√
d) adap-
tively chosen statistical queries. Moreover, there is an efficient algorithm that accurately answers
Ω˜(n2) adaptively chosen queries.
We emphasize that exponential running time was known to be inherent for differentially
private algorithms that answer n2+o(1) statistical queries [Ull13], but prior to our results it
was possible that there was an efficient oracle that accurately answered exponentially many
adaptively chosen statistical queries via a different approach.
1.3 Related work
The combination of fingerprinting codes and encryption in our one-round approach is a com-
mon technique in the construction of “traitor-tracing schemes.” Traitor-tracing schemes were
introduced by Chor, Fiat, and Naor [CFN94], also for the problem of secure distribution of dig-
ital content. Dwork et al. [DNR+09] were the first to show that traitor-tracing schemes can be
used to prove computational hardness results for differential privacy. Ullman [Ull13] showed
that traitor-tracing schemes with certain non-standard security properties can be used to prove
strong computational hardness results for differential privacy, and showed how to construct
such a scheme. In fact, the one-round approach described above closely mirrors the traitor-
tracing scheme constructed in [Ull13]. See [Ull13] for a more detailed discussion of prior work
on traitor-tracing and the issues that arise when using traitor-tracing schemes in the context of
differential privacy.
Our work was also inspired by recent work of Hardt and Woodruff [HW13], which showed
that no low-dimensional linear sketch can give valid answers to even a polynomial number
of adaptively chosen queries. Technically our results are largely orthogonal to theirs, since
we consider arbitrary computationally efficient statistical query oracles, rather than linear
sketches. However, their work also noted the connection between differential privacy and
validly answering adaptively chosen queries. On the technical side, our iterative approach
was inspired by their results.
There is also a large body of work on the computational hardness of certain learning prob-
lems. Many of these results have a similar flavor to ours in showing that any computationally
efficient algorithm requires either large running time or a large number of samples from the
distribution in order to learn a valid hypothesis. However, we are not aware of any result
showing a hardness result specific to adaptively chosen queries.
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2 Preliminaries
Let D be a distribution over {0,1}d , for some parameter d ∈ N. We are interested in answer-
ing statistical queries about the distribution D. A statistical query on {0,1}d is specified by a
predicate q : {0,1}d → {0,1} and is defined to be
q(D) = E
x←RD
[q(x)] .
The goal is to design an oracleO that answers statistical queries about the unknown distribution
D, given only iid samples x1, . . . ,xn from D. In this work, we are interested in the case where
the queries may be adaptively and adversarially chosen.
Specifically, O is a stateful algorithm that holds a tuple of samples x1,x2, · · · ∈ {0,1}∗, takes a
statistical query q as input, and returns a real-valued answer a ∈ [0,1]. We require that when x
consists of iid samples from D, the answer a is close to q(D), and moreover that this condition
holds for every query in an adaptively chosen sequence q1,q2, . . . . Formally, we define the
accuracy guarantee using the following game with a stateful adversary A.
A chooses a distribution D over {0,1}d
Sample x1, . . . ,xn←R D, let x = (x1, . . . ,xn)
For j = 1, . . . , k
A(q1, a1, . . . , qj−1, aj−1) outputs a query qj
O(x,qj ) outputs aj
Figure 1: Accn,d,k[O,A]
Definition 2.1 (Accurate Oracle). An oracle O is (α,β)-accurate for k adaptively chosen queries
given n samples in {0,1}d if for every adversary A,
Pr
Accn,d,k[O,A]
[
∀j ∈ [k] ∣∣∣O(x,qj )− qj(D)∣∣∣ ≤ α] ≥ 1− β .
As a shorthand, we will say that O is α-accurate for k queries if for every n,d ∈N, O is (α,on(1))-
accurate for k queries given n samples in {0,1}d . Here, k may depend on n and d and on(1) is a
function of n that tends to 0.
We are interested in oracles that are both accurate and computationally efficient. We say
that an oracle O is computationally efficient if when given samples x1, . . . ,xn ∈ {0,1}d and a query
q : {0,1}d → {0,1} it runs in time poly(n,d, |q|). Here q will be represented as a circuit that
evaluates q(x) and |q| denotes the size of this circuit.
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2.1 Fingerprinting codes
Collusion-resilient fingerprinting codes were introduced by Boneh and Shaw [BS98] for the
problem of watermarking digital content. A fingerprinting code is a pair of efficient algorithms
(FPC.Gen,FPC.Trace). The code generator FPC.Gen takes a number of users p as input and
outputs a matrix F ∈ {0,1}p×`FPC(p), for some function `FPC :N→N. We think of F as consisting
of p codewords, one for each user i ∈ [p], with each codeword being of length `FPC = `FPC(p). For
a subset of users S ⊆ [p], we use FS to denote the |S | × `FPC matrix consisting of the subset of
codewords belonging to users in S.
The security property says that any codeword can be “traced” to its corresponding user.
Moreover, the code is fully collusion-resilient—if any subset of users S ⊆ [p] “combines” their
codewords in an arbitrary manner, then the combined codeword a ∈ {0,1}`FPC can also be traced
to one of the users in S, provided that the combined codeword is “consistent” with FS in a
very weak sense. For the standard definition of fingerprinting codes, the consistency condition
would require that for every column j of FS , if every entry of the j-th column shares the same
bit b, then the j-th entry of a is also b. Formally, we will use the condition that for every j,
|aj −Ei∈S [FS(i, j)] | ≤ 1/3. For our results we require a stronger, error-robust fingerprinting code,
that can trace combined codewords that only respect a relaxed consistency condition, in which
the above constraint on a is only required to hold for 99% of columns j.
Specifically, for any set of codewords FS , we define
Con(FS ) =
{
a ∈ {0,1}`FPC
∣∣∣∣∣ for .99`FPC choices of j, ∣∣∣∣∣aj − Ei∈S [FS(i, j)]
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ 1/3}
We can now formally define error-robust fingerprinting codes
Definition 2.2. For a function `FPC :N→N, a pair of efficient algorithms (FPC.Gen,FPC.Trace)
is an error-robust fingerprinting code of length `FPC if
1. for every p ∈N, FPC.Gen(1p) outputs a matrix F ∈ {0,1}p×`FPC(p) and
2. for every (possibly randomized) adversaryAFPC and every S ⊆ [p], if a←R AFPC(FS ), then
Pr
F←RFPC.Gen(1p)
[a ∈ Con(FS )∧FPC.Trace(F,a) < S] ≤ negl(p).
Bun, Ullman, and Vadhan [BUV14] introduced error-robust fingerprinting codes. They
gave a construction with nearly-optimal length, building on the nearly-optimal construction
of standard (non-robust) fingerprinting codes by Tardos [Tar08].
Theorem 2.3 ([BUV14], building on [Tar08]). For every p ∈N, there exists an error-robust finger-
printing code of length `FPC(p) = Θ˜(p2).
For our results, we will need an additional technical lemma about the fingerprinting code
in [BUV14] that we will use for our results. The lemma states that if |S | is at least a sufficiently
large constant, then for most columns j, the mean of the j-th column of F and that of FS are
close. In order to prove the lemma, we need to partially describe the algorithm FPC.Gen.
Lemma 2.4. For every p ≥ 500, and every S ⊆ [p] such that |S | ≥ 500, we have
Pr
F←RFPC.Gen
[
for .99`FPC choices of j,
∣∣∣∣∣∣ Ei∈[p] [F(i, j)]− Ei∈S [FS(i, j)]
∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ 1/6
]
≥ 1−negl(p)
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Choose parameters p1, . . . ,p`FPC ∈ [0,1]. (The parameters pj must be chosen from a partic-
ular distribution, which is not relevant for our purposes)
For every i ∈ [p], j ∈ [`FPC], let F(i, j) = 1 with probability pj , independently
Figure 2: FPC.Gen
Proof. Fix any p1, . . . ,p`FPC ∈ [0,1] and any j ∈ [`FPC]. Then for every i ∈ [S], F(i, j) is an indepen-
dent Bernoulli random variable with success probability pj . Thus, by a Hoeffding bound2
Pr
[∣∣∣∣∣∣ Ei∈[p] [F(i, j)]− pj
∣∣∣∣∣∣ > 1/12
]
≤ 2exp(−p/72) ≤ 1/400
and Pr
[∣∣∣∣∣Ei∈S [F(i, j)]− pj
∣∣∣∣∣ > 1/12] ≤ 2exp(−|S |/72) ≤ 1/400.
Thus, by a triangle inequality, it holds that
Pr
[∣∣∣∣∣∣Ei∈S [F(i, j)]− Ei∈[p] [F(i, j)]
∣∣∣∣∣∣ > 1/6
]
≤ 1/200
If we let Bj be the indicator variable of the event
{
|Ei∈S [F(i, j)] − Ei∈[p] [F(i, j)] | > 1/6
}
, then
E
[∑`FPC
i=1 Bj
]
≤ `FPC/200. Since the parameters pj are fixed, the events Bj are independent. Thus,
by a Hoeffding bound, Pr
[∑`FPC
i=1 Bj > `FPC/100
]
≤ exp(−`FPC/20000) ≤ negl(p). The final in-
equality holds because `FPC = `FPC(p) = Θ˜(p2). Since the conclusion holds for every fixed choice
of parameters pj , it also holds when the parameters pj are chosen randomly as in FPC.Gen.
3 Lower bound for natural oracles
In this section we prove our main result in the special case where the oracle satisfies a natural
condition, roughly speaking, that it does not evaluate a given query outside its sample. The
proof is technically simpler in this case as it is unconditional and does not rely on any crypto-
graphic constructions. Nevertheless, the proof outline is essentially the same as in the general
case and so it is instructive to begin with this special case.
Definition 3.1. An oracle O is natural if for every input sample S and every two queries q and
q′ such that q(x) = q′(x) for all x ∈ S, the answers a and a′ that the oracle gives on queries q
and q′ , respectively, are identical if the oracle is deterministic and identically distributed if the
oracle is randomized. If the oracle is stateful, then this condition should hold when the oracle
is in any of its possible states.
We will now show that there is no natural oracle that is accurate for a sufficiently large
number of adaptively chosen queries. To do so, we will construct an adversary that chooses a
distribution D, and then issues queries to the oracle in such a way that any computationally
efficient oracle that is given samples from D will fail to answer all queries correctly.
2For independent random variables X1, . . . ,Xm ∈ [0,1], if X = 1m
∑m
i=1Xi , then Pr[X > E [X] + τ] ≤ exp(−2τ2m)
and Pr[|X −E [X] | > τ] ≤ 2exp(−2τ2m).
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The adversary is described in Figure 4 and proceeds in three phases. In the first phase the
adversary chooses the distribution D randomly. Then the oracle is given samples from D and
the adversary performs a recovery phase in order to identify (most of) the samples the oracle
received. Finally, the adversary uses knowledge of (most of) the samples to find a query that
the oracle cannot answer accurately. In the figure, (FPC.Gen,FPC.Trace) is a fingerprinting code
of length `FPC(p).
Given a parameter n, let p = 2000n and R = n− 500.
Let D be the uniform distribution over {1, . . . ,p}.
Choose samples x1, . . . ,xn←R D, let x = (x1, . . . ,xn).
Let S ⊆ [p] be the set of unique numbers appearing in x.
Recovery phase:
Sample fingerprinting codes F1, . . . ,FR←R FPC.Gen(1p) of length `FPC = `FPC(p).
Let T 0 = ∅
For round r = 1 to R:
For j = 1, . . . , `FPC :
Define the query qrj (i) to be F
r(i, j) if i < T r−1 and 0 otherwise.
Let arj = O(x;qrj )
Let ar = (ar1, . . . , a
r
`FPC
)
Let ir = FPC.Trace(Fr , ar ), and let T r = T r−1 ∪ {ir}
Attack phase:
Let φ = 0 with probability 1/2 and φ = 1/500 with probability 1/2
Sample a random subset B ⊆ [p] of size φ · p.
Let mi = 1 for all i ∈ B and 0 for all i ∈ [p] \B.
Define the query q∗(i) to be mi if i < T R and 0 otherwise.
Let a∗ = O(x,q∗).
Figure 3: Attackn[O]
3.1 Analysis of the recovery phase
The goal of the recovery phase of the algorithm is to identify most of the samples x1, . . . ,xn that
are held by the oracle. Once the attacker has this information, he can use it to find queries that
distinguish the oracle’s samples from the population and force the oracle to be inaccurate.
In order to recover samples, the attacker will force the oracle to give answers that are con-
sistent with the fingerprinting codes F1, . . . ,FR, which are then given to FPC.Trace to recover an
element of the sample. Our first claim establishes that an accurate oracle will indeed force the
oracle to give answers consistent with the fingerprinting codes.
Claim 3.2. If O is (1/12)-accurate for n · `FPC(2000n) + 1 adaptively chosen queries, then
Pr
Attackn[O]
∀r ∈ [R], for .99`FPC choices of j ∈ [`FPC],∣∣∣∣O(x,qrj )−Ei∈S\T r−1 [Fr(i, j)]∣∣∣∣ ≤ 1/3
 ≥ 1− o(1) .
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Proof. First we show that,
Pr
Attack
[
∀r ∈ [R], j ∈ [`FPC]
∣∣∣∣∣∣O(x,qrj )− Ei∈[p] [Fr(i, j)]
∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ 1/6
]
≥ 1− o(1) .
Observe that by definition, for every r, j,
E
(i,ski )←RD
[
qrj (i)
]
=
1
p
∑
i∈[p]\T r−1
Fr(i, j) .
Since |T r−1| ≤ n and Fr(i, j) ∈ {0,1}, for every r, j,∣∣∣∣∣∣ Ei←RD [qrj (i)]− Ei∈[p] [Fr(i, j)]
∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ np ≤ 112 . (1)
The oracle’s input x consists of n samples fromD. Moreover, the total number of queries issued
to the oracle is at most k = n · `FPC(2000n) + 1. Since the oracle is assumed to be (1/12)-accurate
for k queries given n samples in {0,1}d ,
Pr
Attack
[
∀r, j
∣∣∣∣∣∣O(x,qrj )− E(i,ski )←RD [qrj (i, ski)]
∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ 112
]
≥ 1− o(1) . (2)
Applying the triangle inequality to (1) and (2), this shows
Pr
Attack
[
∀r, j
∣∣∣∣∣∣O(x,qrj )− Ei∈[p] [Fr(i, j)]
∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ 1/6
]
≥ 1− o(1) . (3)
By Lemma 2.4, since |S \ T r−1| ≥ 500, for every r,
Pr
[
for .99`FPC choices of j,
∣∣∣∣∣∣ Ei∈[p] [Fr(i, j)]− Ei∈S [FrS(i, j)]
∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ 1/6
]
≥ 1−negl(n) .
where the probability is taken over the choice of Fr ←R FPC.Gen. By a union bound over
r = 1, . . . ,R, where R = n− 500, if F1, . . . ,FR←R FPC.Gen, then
Pr
[
∀r, for .99`FPC choices of j,
∣∣∣∣∣∣ Ei∈[p] [Fr(i, j)]− Ei∈S [FrS(i, j)]
∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ 1/6
]
≥ 1−negl(n) . (4)
The claim now follows by combining (3) and (4).
Now that we have established Claim 4.1, we know that in every round r, the oracle O
holding x returns a set of answers that are consistent with the fingerprinting code FrS\T r−1 .
However, this fact alone is not enough to guarantee that FPC.Trace returns a user in S \ T r−1,
because the queries to the oracle depend on rows of Fr for users outside of S \T r−1, whereas the
security of the fingerprinting code applies only to algorithms that only have access to the rows
of Fr for users in S \T r−1. However, if we assume that the oracle is natural, then its answers do
not depend on information about the query at points outside of the sample S.
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Lemma 3.3. If O is a natural oracle and is (1/12)-accurate for n ·`FPC(2000n) + 1 adaptively chosen
queries, then
Pr
Attackn,d [O]
[
|S \ T R| > 500
]
= o(1)
Proof. Fix any round r ∈ {1, . . . , |S | − 500} and let U = S \T r−1. By the security of the fingerprint-
ing code, we have that for every algorithm A
Pr
Fr←RFPC.Gen(1p)
[
(A(FrU ) ∈ Con(FrU )) ∧ (FPC.Trace(Fr ,A(FrU )) <U )
]
≤ negl(n)
Observe that the oracle O is natural and therefore the answer it gives on any query cannot
depend on rows of Fr that belong to users outside of S. Moreover, the query is 0 on points in
T r−1 and The queries issued in rounds r ′ , r depend only on Fr ′ , which is independent from
Fr . Hence, the answer of the oracle depends only on points in U. We therefore have
Pr
Fr←RFPC.Gen(1p)
[
(ar ∈ Con(FrU )) ∧ (FPC.Trace(Fr , ar ) <U )
]
≤ negl(n) . (5)
By a union bound over r = 1, . . . , |S | − 500, we also have
Pr
F1,...,F |S |−500←RFPC.Gen(1p)
 ∃r
(
ar ∈ Con(FrS\T r−1)
)
∧
(
FPC.Trace(Fr , ar ) < S \ T r−1
)  ≤ negl(n) (6)
By Claim 3.2, we have that with probability at least 1−o(1), it holds that for all r ∈ {1, . . . , |S | − 500}
and for .99`FPC choices of j ∈ [`FPC] ∣∣∣∣∣arj − Ei∈U [Fr(i, j)]
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ 1/3
Note that in order to apply Claim 3.2 we have used the fact that when r ∈ {1, . . . , |S | − 500},
|S \ T r−1| ≥ 500. If this condition is satisfied, then indeed ar ∈ Con(FrU ). Therefore, combining
with (6), we have
Pr
F1,...,F |S |−500←RFPC.Gen(1p)
[
∃r,FPC.Trace(Fr , ar ) < S \ T r−1
]
≤ o(1) .
Now the claim follows by observing that
Pr
Attack
[
|S \ T R| > 500
]
≤ Pr
Attack
[
∃r ∈ {1, . . . , |S | − 500} FPC.Trace(Fr , ar ) < S \ T r−1
]
≤ o(1) .
3.2 Analysis of the Attack Phase
At this point we know that if the oracle is natural and accurately answers all the queries in
the recovery phase, then with high probability |S \ T R| ≤ 500. Next we show that if this event
occurs, then the probability that the oracle answers q∗ accurately in the attack phase is bounded
away from 1 by a constant. Since an accurate oracle is required to answer each query accurately
with probability at least 1− o(1), we will obtain a contradiction.
To begin with we show that the population answer q∗(D) is close to the value φ in the attack.
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Claim 3.4. In Attackn[O], we have |q∗(D)−φ| ≤ 1/2000.
Proof. The case φ = 0 we have q∗(D) = 0. If φ = 1/500, then we have that Ei∈[p]mi = φ since
|B| = φ · p. Hence,
q∗(D) = E
i∼Dq
∗(i) = φ− Pr
i←R[p]
[
i ∈ T R ∧mi = 1
]
where Pr
[
i ∈ T R ∧mi = 1
]
≤ Pr
[
i ∈ T R
]
= |T R|/p = (n− 500)/p ≤ 1/2000.
We will now show that the oracle cannot guess the value of φ with sufficiently high proba-
bility provided that the recovery phase succeeded.
Claim 3.5.
Pr
Attackn[O]
[(
|S \ T R| ≤ 500
)
∧ ∣∣∣O(x,q∗)−φ∣∣∣ ≤ 1
2000
]
≤ 1−Ω(1)
Proof. Consider the case where φ = 1/500. We have
Pr
[
∀i ∈ S \ T R, mi = 0
∣∣∣ |S \ T R| ≤ 500 ] ≥ 499∏
i=0
(
(1−φ)p − i
p − i
)
≥
(
(1−φ)p − 499
p − 499
)500
=
(
1−φ p
p − 499
)500
≥ (1− 2φ)500 =
(
1− 1
250
)500
≥ 1
4e2
where we used that p ≥ 2000. On the other hand, when φ = 0, we have
Pr
[
∀i ∈ S \ T R, mi = 0
∣∣∣ |S \ T R| ≤ 500 ] = 1.
Note that because the oracle is natural it answer only depends on mi for i ∈ S \ T R. When the
oracle sees only that mi = 0 for every i ∈ S \T R, it cannot give an answer that is simultaneously
accurate to within 1/2000 for both the case of φ = 0 and for the case of φ = 1/500. The event
mi = 0 for every i ∈ S \ T R occurs with at least probability 1/4e2 as shown above. Conditioned
on this event, both cases φ = 0 and φ = 1/500 have constant probability. Hence, the answer of
the oracle must be far from φ with constant probability. Formally,
Pr
Attack
[ ∣∣∣O(x,q∗)−φ∣∣∣ ≤ 1
2000
∣∣∣∣∣ |S \ T R| ≤ 500] ≤ 1−Ω(1) .
By Lemma, this implies
Pr
Attack
[(∣∣∣O(x,q∗)−φ∣∣∣ ≤ 1
2000
)
∧ (|S \ T R| ≤ 500)
]
≤ 1−Ω(1)
1− o(1) ≤ 1−Ω(1) .
Lemma 3.6. If O is natural, then
Pr
Attackn,d [O]
[
(|S \ T R| ≤ 500)∧ |O(x,q∗)− q∗(D)| ≤ 1
2000
]
≤ 1−Ω(1)
Proof. By Claim 3.4, we have that |q∗(D)−φ| ≤ 1/2000. Claim 3.5 shows that
Pr
Attack
[
(|S \ T R| ≤ 500)∧ ∣∣∣O(x,q∗)−φ∣∣∣ ≤ 1
2000
]
≤ 1−Ω(1) .
The statement of the lemma now follows from a triangle inequality.
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3.3 Putting it together
Theorem 3.7. There is no natural oracle O that is (1/2000)-accurate for n3+o(1) adaptively chosen
queries given n samples.
Proof. The entire attack will consist of k = R · `FPC + 1 queries, where R = n − 500 and `FPC =
O˜(p2) = O˜(n2). Therefore the entire attack consists of k = n3+o(1) queries.
Therefore, if O is natural, by Lemma 3.2,
Pr
Attackn[O]
[
|S \ T R| > 500
]
= on(1)
By Lemma 3.6,
Pr
Attackn[O]
[
(|S \ T R| ≤ 500)∧ |O(x,q∗)− q∗(D)| ≤ 1
2000
]
≤ 1−Ω(1)
Combining these two statements gives
Pr
Attackn[O]
[
|O(x,q∗)− q∗(D)| ≤ 1
2000
]
≤ 1−Ω(1)
However, the definition of an accurate oracle asserts, in particular, that
Pr
Attackn[O]
[
|O(x,q∗)− q∗(D)| ≤ 1
2000
]
≥ 1− o(1)
and thereby we obtain a contradiction.
4 Lower bound for all computationally bounded oracles
In this section we will show that there is no computationally efficient oracle that is accurate
for a sufficiently large number of adaptively chosen queries, and thereby formally establish
Theorem 1.1 in the introduction. To do so, we will construct an adversary that chooses a dis-
tribution D, and then issues queries to the oracle such that no computationally efficient oracle
given samples from D can answer all the queries correctly.
4.1 Encryption schemes
Our attack relies on the existence of a semantically secure private-key encryption scheme that
we briefly recall here. An encryption scheme is a triple of efficient algorithms (Gen,Enc,Dec)
with the following syntax:
• Gen is a randomized algorithm that a security parameter λ and outputs an `Enc(λ)-bit
secret key for some non-decreasing function `Enc :N→N. Formally, sk←R Gen(1λ).
• Enc is a randomized algorithm that takes as input a secret key and a one-bit message
m ∈ {0,1} and outputs a ciphertext c. Formally, c←R Enc(sk,m).
• Dec is a deterministic algorithm that takes as input a secret key and a ciphertext c and
outputs a decryptionm′. If the ciphertext c was an encryption ofm under the key sk, then
m′ =m. Formally, if c←R Enc(sk,m), then Dec(sk,c) =m with probability 1.
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Roughly, security of the encryption scheme asserts that no polynomial time adversary who
does not know the secret key can distinguish encryptions of m = 0 from encryptions of m =
1, even if the adversary has access to an oracle that returns the encryption of an arbitrary
message under the unknown key. For convenience, we will require that this security property
holds simultaneously for an arbitrary polynomial number of secret keys. The existence of
an encryption scheme with this property follows immediately from the existence an ordinary
semantically secure encryption scheme. We start with the stronger definition only to simplify
our proofs. A secure encryption scheme exists under the minimal cryptographic assumption
that one-way functions exist. The formal definition of security is not needed until Section A.
4.2 Description of the attack
The adversary is specified in Figure 4. The adversary works in three phases. In the first phase
the adversary chooses the distribution D randomly. Then the oracle is given samples from D
and the adversary performs a recovery phase in order to identify (most of) the samples the
oracle received. Finally, the adversary uses knowledge of (most of) the samples to find a query
that the oracle cannot answer accurately. See Section 1.1 for more informal description of the
adversary. In Figure 4, (Gen,Enc,Dec) is an encryption scheme with key length `Enc(λ) and
(FPC.Gen,FPC.Trace) is a fingerprinting code of length `FPC(p). Observe that Attackn,d is only
well defined for pairs n,d ∈N such that there exists λ ∈N for which `Enc(1) + dlog(2000n)e ≤ d.
Through this section we will assume that n = n(d) = poly(d) and that d is a sufficiently large
constant, which ensures that Attackn,d is well defined.
4.3 Analysis of the recovery phase
The goal of the recovery phase of the algorithm is to identify most of the samples x1, . . . ,xn that
are held by the oracle. Once the attacker has this information, he can use it to find queries that
distinguish the oracle’s keys from the population and force the oracle to be inaccurate.
In order to recover keys, the attacker will force the oracle to give answers that are consis-
tent with the fingerprinting codes F1, . . . ,FR, which are then given to FPC.Trace to recover an
element of the sample. Our first claim establishes that an accurate oracle will indeed force the
oracle to give answers consistent with the fingerprinting codes.
Claim 4.1. If O is (1/12)-accurate for n · `FPC(2000n) + 1 adaptively chosen queries then for every
polynomial n = n(d) and every sufficiently large d ∈N,
Pr
Attackn,d [O]
∀r ∈ [R], for .99`FPC choices of j ∈ [`FPC],∣∣∣∣O(x,qrj )−Ei∈S\T r−1 [Fr(i, j)]∣∣∣∣ ≤ 1/3
 ≥ 1− o(1)
Proof. First we show that,
Pr
Attack
[
∀r ∈ [R], j ∈ [`FPC]
∣∣∣∣∣∣O(x,qrj )− Ei∈[p] [Fr(i, j)]
∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ 1/6
]
≥ 1− o(1)
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The distribution D:
Given parameters d,n, let p = 2000n, let R = n− 500
Let λ be the largest integer such that `Enc(λ) + dlogpe ≤ d
For i ∈ [p], let ski ←R Gen(1λ) and let yi = (i, ski)
Let D be the uniform distribution over
{
y1, . . . , yp
}
⊆ {0,1}d
Choose samples x1, . . . ,xn←R D, let x = (x1, . . . ,xn)
Let S ⊆ [p] be the set of unique indices i such that (i, ski) appears in x
Recovery phase:
Setup fingerprinting codes and ciphertexts:
Let F1, . . . ,FR←R FPC.Gen(1p), let `FPC = `FPC(p) be code length
For r = 1, . . . ,R, i = 1, . . . ,p, j = 1, . . . , `FPC, let cr(i, j) = Enc(ski ,Fr(i, j))
Let T 0 = ∅
For round r = 1, . . . ,R:
For j = 1, . . . , `FPC :
Define the query qrj (i
′ , sk′) to be Dec(sk′ , cr(i′ , j)) if i′ < T r−1 and 0 otherwise
Let arj = O(x;qrj )
Let ar = (ar1, . . . , a
r
`FPC
)
Let ir = FPC.Trace(Fr , ar ), and let T r = T r−1 ∪ {ir}
Attack phase:
Let φ = 0 with probability 1/2 and φ = 1/500 with probability 1/2
Sample a random subset B ⊆ [p] of size φ · p.
Let mi = 1 for all i ∈ B and 0 for all i ∈ [p] \B
Let c∗i = Enc(ski ,mi) for all i ∈ [p]
Define the query q∗(i′ , sk′) to be Dec(sk′ , c∗i′ ) if i′ < T R and 0 otherwise
Let a∗ = O(x,q∗)
Figure 4: Attackn,d[O]
Observe that by definition, for every r, j,
E
(i,ski )←RD
[
qrj (i, ski)
]
=
1
p
∑
i∈[p]\T r−1
Dec(ski , c
r(i, j)) +
1
p
∑
i∈T r−1
0
=
1
p
∑
i∈[p]\T r−1
Fr(i, j)
where the last equality is because cr(i, j)←R Enc(ski ,Fr(i, j)). Since |T r−1| ≤ n and Fr(i, j) ∈ {0,1},
∀r, j
∣∣∣∣∣∣ E(i,ski )←RD [qrj (i, ski)]− Ei∈[p] [Fr(i, j)]
∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ np ≤ 112 (7)
17
In Attack, the oracle’s input x consists of n samples from D. Moreover, the total number of
queries issued to the oracle is at most k = n · `FPC(2000n) + 1. Since the oracle is assumed to be
(1/12)-accurate for k queries given n samples in {0,1}d ,
Pr
Attack
[
∀r, j
∣∣∣∣∣∣O(x,qrj )− E(i,ski )←RD [qrj (i, ski)]
∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ 112
]
≥ 1− o(1) (8)
Applying the triangle inequality to (7) and (8), this shows
Pr
Attack
[
∀r, j
∣∣∣∣∣∣O(x,qrj )− Ei∈[p] [Fr(i, j)]
∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ 1/6
]
≥ 1− o(1) . (9)
By Lemma 2.4, since |S \ T r−1| ≥ 500, for every r, if Fr ←R FPC.Gen(1p), then
Pr
[
for .99`FPC choices of j,
∣∣∣∣∣∣ Ei∈[p] [Fr(i, j)]− Ei∈S [FrS(i, j)]
∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ 1/6
]
≥ 1−negl(n)
where the probability is taken over the choice of Fr ←R FPC.Gen. By a union bound over
r = 1, . . . ,R, where R = n− 500, if F1, . . . ,FR←R FPC.Gen, then
Pr
[
∀r, for .99`FPC choices of j,
∣∣∣∣∣∣ Ei∈[p] [Fr(i, j)]− Ei∈S [FrS(i, j)]
∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ 1/6
]
≥ 1−negl(n) (10)
The claim now follows by combining (9) and (10).
Now that we have established Claim 4.1, we know that in every round r, the oracle O hold-
ing x returns a set of answers that are consistent with the fingerprinting code FrS\T r−1 . However,
this fact alone is not enough to guarantee that FPC.Trace returns a user in S \T r−1, because the
queries to the oracle depend on rows of Fr for users outside of S \ T r−1, whereas the security
of the fingerprinting code applies only to algorithms that only have access to the rows of Fr
for users in S \ T r−1. To remedy this problem we rely on the fact that the rows of Fr outside of
S \T r−1 are encrypted under keys sk that are not known to the oracle. Thus, a computationally
efficient oracle “does not know” those rows. We can formalize this argument by comparing
Attack to an IdealAttack where rows of Fr for users outside of S \T r−1 are replaced with zeros,
and argue that the adversary cannot distinguish between these two attacks without breaking
the security of the encryption scheme.
Claim 4.2. Let Z1 be the event
∀r ∈ [R], for .99`FPC choices of j ∈ [`FPC],
∣∣∣∣∣O(x,qrj )− Ei∈S\T r−1 [Fr(i, j)]
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ 1/3
Assume (Gen,Enc,Dec) is a computationally secure encryption scheme with key length `Enc(λ) = λ
and let n = n(d) be any polynomial. Then if O is computationally efficient, for every d ∈N∣∣∣∣∣∣ PrIdealAttackn,d [O] [Z1]− PrAttackn,d [O] [Z1]
∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ negl(d)
The proof follows from the security of the encryption scheme. We defer the details to
Section A.
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The distribution D:
Given parameters d,n, let p = 2000n, let R = n− 500
Let λ be the largest integer such that `Enc(λ) + dlogpe ≤ d
For i ∈ [p], let ski ←R Gen(1λ) and let yi = (i, ski)
Let D be the uniform distribution over
{
y1, . . . , yp
}
⊆ {0,1}d
Choose samples x1, . . . ,xn←R D, let x = (x1, . . . ,xn)
Let S ⊆ [p] be the set of unique indices i such that (i, ski) appears in x
Recovery phase:
Setup fingerprinting codes and ciphertexts:
Let F1, . . . ,FR←R FPC.Gen(1p), let `FPC = `FPC(p) be code length
For r = 1, . . . ,R, i ∈ S, j = 1, . . . , `FPC, let cr(i, j) = Enc(ski ,Fr(i, j))
For r = 1, . . . ,R, i ∈ [p] \ S, j = 1, . . . , `FPC, let cr(i, j) = Enc(ski ,0)
Let T 0 = ∅
For round r = 1, . . . ,R:
For j = 1, . . . , `FPC :
Define the query qrj (i
′ , sk′) to be Dec(sk′ , cr(i′ , j)) if i′ < T r−1 and 0 otherwise
Let arj = O(x;qrj )
Let ar = (ar1, . . . , a
r
`FPC
)
Let ir = FPC.Trace(Fr , ar ), and let T r = T r−1 ∪ {ir}
Attack phase:
Let φ = 0 with probability 1/2 and φ = 1/500 with probability 1/2
Sample a random subset B ⊆ [p] of size φ · p.
Let mi = 1 for all i ∈ B and 0 for all i ∈ [p] \B
For each i ∈ S, let c∗i = Enc(ski ,mi), for each i ∈ [p] \ S, let c∗i = Enc(ski ,0)
Define the query q∗(i′ , sk′) to be Dec(sk′ , c∗i′ ) if i′ < T R and 0 otherwise
Let a∗ = O(x,q∗)
Figure 5: IdealAttackn,d[O]
Claim 4.3. If O is computationally efficient and (1/12)-accurate for n · `FPC(2000n) + 1 adaptively
chosen queries, then for any polynomial n = n(d), and every sufficiently large d ∈N,
Pr
IdealAttackn,d [O]
∀r ∈ [R], for .99`FPC choices of j ∈ [`FPC],∣∣∣∣O(x,qrj )−Ei∈S\T r−1 [Fr(i, j)]∣∣∣∣ ≤ 1/3
 ≥ 1− o(1)
The proof is immediate by combining Claim 4.1 and Claim 4.2.
Next, we argue that in IdealAttack, with high probability FPC.Trace only outputs users
contained in the sample S.
Claim 4.4. If O is computationally efficient and (1/12)-accurate for n · `FPC(2000n) + 1 adaptively
chosen queries, then for any polynomial n = n(d), and every sufficiently large d ∈N,
Pr
IdealAttackn,d [O]
[
|S \ T R| > 500
]
≤ o(1)
19
Proof. Fix any round r ∈ {1, . . . , |S | − 500} and let U = S \T r−1. By the security of the fingerprint-
ing code, we have that for every algorithm A
Pr
Fr←RFPC.Gen(1p)
[
(A(FrU ) ∈ Con(FrU )) ∧ (FPC.Trace(Fr ,A(FrU )) <U )
]
≤ negl(n)
Observe that in IdealAttack, the oracle O is never given any input that depends on rows of
Fr that belong to users outside of U : The queries issued in rounds r ′ , r depend only on Fr ′ ,
which is independent from Fr . And in round r the query only depends on ciphertexts cr(i, j)
for i < T r−1, which are all independent of Fr(i, j) whenever i <U . Therefore we have
Pr
Fr←RFPC.Gen(1p)
[
(ar ∈ Con(FrU )) ∧ (FPC.Trace(Fr , ar ) <U )
]
≤ negl(n) (11)
By a union bound over r = 1, . . . , |S | − 500, we also have
Pr
F1,...,F |S |−500←RFPC.Gen(1p)
 ∃r
(
ar ∈ Con(FrS\T r−1)
)
∧
(
FPC.Trace(Fr , ar ) < S \ T r−1
)  ≤ negl(n) (12)
By Claim 4.3, we have that with probability at least 1−o(1), it holds that for all r ∈ {1, . . . , |S | − 500}
and for .99`FPC choices of j ∈ [`FPC] ∣∣∣∣∣arj − Ei∈U [Fr(i, j)]
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ 1/3
Note that in order to apply Claim 4.3 we have used the fact that when r ∈ {1, . . . , |S | − 500},
|S \ T r−1| ≥ 500. If this condition is satisfied, then indeed ar ∈ Con(FrU ). Therefore, combining
with (12), we have
Pr
F1,...,F |S |−500←RFPC.Gen(1p)
[
∃r,FPC.Trace(Fr , ar ) < S \ T r−1
]
≤ o(1)
Now the claim follows by observing that
Pr
IdealAttackn,d [O]
[
|S \ T R| > 500
]
≤ Pr
IdealAttackn,d [O]
[
∃r ∈ {1, . . . , |S | − 500} FPC.Trace(Fr , ar ) < S \ T r−1
]
≤ o(1)
Finally, we show that if |S\T R| ≤ 500 with high probability in IdealAttack, then |S\T R| ≤ 500
with high probability in Attack. Again, we do so by arguing that Attack and IdealAttack are
computationally indistinguishable.
Claim 4.5. Let Z2 be the event
{
|S \ T R| ≤ 500
}
. Assume (Gen,Enc,Dec) is a computationally secure
encryption scheme with key length `Enc(λ) = λ and let n = n(d) be any polynomial. Then if O is
computationally efficient, for every d ∈N∣∣∣∣∣∣ PrIdealAttackn,d [O] [Z2]− PrAttackn,d [O] [Z2]
∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ negl(d) .
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The proof follows from the security of the encryption scheme. We defer the details to
Section A.
Lemma 4.6. If O is computationally efficient and (1/12)-accurate for n · `FPC(2000n) + 1 adaptively
chosen queries, then for any polynomial n = n(d), and every sufficiently large d ∈N,
Pr
Attackn,d [O]
[
|S \ T R| > 500
]
= o(1)
The proof is immediate by combining Claim 4.4 and Claim 4.5.
4.4 Analysis of the attack phase
By the arguments of Section 4.3, we know that if the oracle is computationally efficient and
accurately answers all the queries in the recovery phase, then with high probability |S \ T R| ≤
500. In this section we will show that if these events indeed occur, then the probability that the
oracle answers q∗ accurately in the attack phase is bounded away from 1 by a constant. Since
an accurate oracle is required to answer each query accurately with probability at least 1−o(1),
we will have obtained a contradiction.
To begin with we show that the population answer q∗(D) is close to the value φ in the real
attack.
Claim 4.7. For every polynomial n = n(d) and every sufficiently large d ∈N, in Attackn,d[O], we
have |q∗(D)−φ| ≤ 1/2000.
Proof. The case φ = 0 we have q∗(D) = 0. If φ = 1/500, then we have that Ei∈[p]mi = φ since
|B| = φ · p. Hence,
q∗(D) = E
(i,sk)∼D
q∗(i, sk) = φ− Pr
i←R[p]
[
i ∈ T R ∧mi = 1
]
where Pr
[
i ∈ T R ∧mi = 1
]
≤ Pr
[
i ∈ T R
]
= |T R|/p = (n− 500)/p ≤ 1/2000.
We will show that the oracle cannot guess the value of φ with sufficiently high probability
in IdealAttack provided that the recovery phase succeeded.
Claim 4.8. For every polynomial n = n(d) and every sufficiently large d ∈N,
Pr
IdealAttackn,d [O]
[(
|S \ T R| ≤ 500
)
∧ ∣∣∣O(x,q∗)−φ∣∣∣ ≤ 1
2000
]
≤ 1−Ω(1)
Proof. Consider the case where φ = 1/500. We have
Pr
[
∀i ∈ S \ T R, mi = 0
∣∣∣ |S \ T R| ≤ 500 ] = 499∏
i=0
(
(1−φ)p − i
p − i
)
≤
(
(1−φ)p − 499
p − 499
)500
=
(
1−φ p
p − 499
)500
≤ (1− 2φ)500 (p ≥ 2000)
=
(
1− 1
250
)500
≥ 1
4e2
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On the other hand, when φ = 0, we have
Pr
[
∀i ∈ S \ T R, mi = 0
∣∣∣|S \ T R| ≤ 500 ] = 1.
Note that in IdealAttack the oracle only sees mi for i ∈ S \ T R. When the oracle sees only that
mi = 0 for every i ∈ S \ T R, it cannot give an answer that is simultaneously accurate to within
1/2000 for both the case of φ = 0 and for the case of φ = 1/500. The event mi = 0 for every
i ∈ S \T R occurs with at least probability 1/2e as shown above. Conditioned on this event, both
cases φ = 0 and φ = 1/500 have constant probability. Hence, the answer of the oracle must be
far from φ with constant probability. Formally,
Pr
IdealAttack
[ ∣∣∣O(x,q∗)−φ∣∣∣ ≤ 1
2000
∣∣∣∣∣ |S \ T R| ≤ 500] ≤ 1−Ω(1) .
By Claim 4.4, this implies
Pr
IdealAttack
[(∣∣∣O(x,q∗)−φ∣∣∣ ≤ 1
2000
)
∧ (|S \ T R| ≤ 500)
]
≤ 1−Ω(1)
1− o(1) ≤ 1−Ω(1) .
As in the analysis of the recovery phase, we will first argue that the probability the oracle
is accurate for q∗ in Attack is nearly the same as it is in an IdealAttack where the query q∗ has
been modified to contain no information about users outside of S.
Claim 4.9. Let Z3 be the event
{
|S \ T R| ≤ 500∧ ∣∣∣O(x,q∗)−φ∣∣∣ ≤ 12000 } . Let (Gen,Enc,Dec) is a com-
putationally secure encryption scheme with key length `Enc(λ) = λ and n = n(d) be any polynomial.
Then if O is computationally efficient,∣∣∣∣∣∣ PrIdealAttackn,d [O] [Z3]− PrAttackn,d [O] [Z3]
∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ negl(d)
The proof will follow from the security of the encryption scheme. We defer the details to
Section A.
Lemma 4.10. If O is computationally efficient, then for any polynomial n = n(d), and every suffi-
ciently large d ∈N,
Pr
Attackn,d [O]
[
(|S \ T R| ≤ 500)∧ |O(x,q∗)− q∗(D)| ≤ 1
2000
]
≤ 1−Ω(1)
Proof. By Claim 4.7, we have that |q∗(D) −φ| ≤ 1/2000. Combining Claim 4.8 with Claim 4.9,
we further have
Pr
Attack
[
(|S \ T R| ≤ 500)∧ ∣∣∣O(x,q∗)−φ∣∣∣ ≤ 1
2000
]
≤ 1−Ω(1) .
The statement of the lemma now follows from a triangle inequality.
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4.5 Putting it together
We can now prove Theorem 1.1 from the introduction.
Theorem 4.11. There is no computationally efficient oracle O that is (1/2000)-accurate for n3+o(1)
adaptively chosen queries given n samples.
Proof. The entire attack will consist of k = R · `FPC + 1 queries, where R = n − 500 and `FPC =
O˜(p2) = O˜(n2). Therefore the entire attack consists of k = n3+o(1) queries.
Therefore, if O, by Lemma 4.6,
Pr
Attackn,d [O]
[
|S \ T R| > 500
]
= on(1)
By Lemma 4.10,
Pr
Attackn,d [O]
[
(|S \ T R| ≤ 500)∧ |O(x,q∗)− q∗(D)| ≤ 1
2000
]
≤ 1−Ω(1)
Combining these two statements gives
Pr
Attackn,d [O]
[
|O(x,q∗)− q∗(D)| ≤ 1
2000
]
≤ 1−Ω(1)
However, the definition of an accurate oracle asserts, in particular, that
Pr
Attackn,d [O]
[
|O(x,q∗)− q∗(D)| ≤ 1
2000
]
≥ 1− o(1)
and thereby we obtain a contradiction.
4.6 An information-theoretic lower bound
In this section we show how our argument can be extended to give an information-theoretic
lower bound when the number of samples is much smaller than the dimensionality of the data
(Theorem 1.2). Since the argument follows the outline of the computational hardness result
quite closely, we only highlight the parts of the proof that need modification. The assump-
tion that the oracle is computationally efficient was used only to establish that Attackn,d[O]
and IdealAttackn,d[O] are indistinguishable (Claims 4.2, 4.5, and 4.9). The argument (proven
in Section A) relies on two facts: 1) that no adversary who runs in time poly(λ) can distin-
guish between an oracle that returns encryptions of chosen messages m1, . . . ,mk and an oracle
that returns encryptions of 0, and 2) there is a secure encryption scheme with keys of length
`Enc(λ) = λ, therefore if n(d) is polynomial, Attackn,d[O] will instantiate the encryption with
security parameter λ =Ω(d).
In order to prove an analogous information-theoretic statement, we first observe that the
number of messages that will be encrypted during the execution of Attackn,d[O] is at most
k = O˜(n3), and the encryption scheme only needs to be secure for k single-bit messages. For any
number of single-bit messages k, there exists an encryption scheme that is secure for k messages
with key length `Enc(λ,k) = k (namely, the classic “one-time pad” encryption scheme). There-
fore, if we choose d ≥ k+dlogpe = O˜(n3), we can instantiate Attackn,d[O] using the information-
theoretically secure encryption scheme. This will suffice to prove an information-theoretic
analogue of Claims 4.2, 4.5, and 4.9, which combined with the remaining arguments of Sec-
tions 4.3 and 4.4, yields Theorem 1.2 in the introduction. Formally,
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Theorem 4.12. There is no oracle O that for every n ∈ N is (1/2000, on(1))-accurate for n3+o(1)
adaptively chosen queries given n samples in {0,1}d for d = d(n) = n3+o(1).
5 Lower bounds for avoiding blatant non-privacy
In this section we show how our arguments also imply that computationally efficient oracles
that guarantee accuracy for adaptively chosen statistical queries must be blatantly non-private,
and thereby establish Theorem 1.3 in the introduction.
5.1 Blatant non-privacy
Before we can define blatant non-privacy, we need to define a notion of accuracy that is more
appropriate for the application to privacy. In contrast to Definition 2.1 where accuracy is de-
fined with respect to the distribution, here we define accurate with respect to the sample itself.
With this change in mind, we model blatant non-privacy via the following game.
Apriv chooses a set y = {y1, . . . , y2n} ⊆ {0,1}d
Sample a random subset x ⊆ y of size n
For j = 1, . . . , k
A(q1, a1, . . . , qj−1, aj−1) outputs a query qj
O(x,qj ) outputs aj
Apriv outputs a set x′ ⊆ y
Figure 6: NonPrivacyn,d[O,Apriv]
Definition 5.1. An oracle O is (α,β)-sample-accurate for k adaptively chosen queries given n sam-
ples in {0,1}d if for every adversary Apriv,
Pr
NonPrivacyn,d,k[O,Apriv]
[
∀j ∈ [k] ∣∣∣O(x,qj )− qj(x)∣∣∣ ≤ α] ≥ 1− β .
As a shorthand, we will say that O is α-sample-accurate for k queries if for every n,d ∈N, O is
(α,on(1))-accurate for k queries given n samples in {0,1}d . Here, k may depend on n and d and
on(1) is a function of n that tends to 0.
Definition 5.2. Giving α-accurate answers to k adaptively chosen queries is blatantly non-private
for efficient oracles if there exists an adversary Apriv such that for every oracle O that is compu-
tationally efficient and α-sample-accurate for k adaptively chosen queries,
Pr
NonPrivacyn,d,k[O,Apriv]
[|x4x′ | > n/100] ≤ on(1)
If the conclusion holds even for computationally inefficient oracles then we replace “for
efficient oracles” with “for unbounded oracles” in the definition.
24
5.2 Lower bounds
In this section we show the following theorem
Theorem 5.3. Giving accurate answers to n3+o(1) adaptively chosen queries is blatantly non-private
for computationally efficient oracles.
We establish this theorem via an adversary that essentially performs only the reconstruction
phase of Attack. The adversary is described in Figure 7. Observe that in Attack, we have
already established that there is an adversary that recovers a set T R such that |T R4x| ≤ 500
when x is drawn from a distribution D and O gives accurate answers for the distribution D.
The key difference between that guarantee and the one we must establish, is that here we want
to establish blatant non-privacy when the oracle is accurate for the sample. However, this can
be addressed via a fairly simple modification to the argument.
The set y:
Given parameters d,n, let R = .99n
Let λ be the largest integer such that `Enc(λ) + dlog2ne ≤ d
For i ∈ [2n], let ski ←R Gen(1λ) and let yi = (i, ski)
Choose a subsample x ⊆ y of size n
Recovery phase:
Setup fingerprinting codes and ciphertexts:
Let F1, . . . ,FR←R FPC.Gen(12n), let `FPC = `FPC(2n) be code length
For r = 1, . . . ,R, i = 1, . . . ,2n, j = 1, . . . , `FPC, let cr(i, j) = Enc(ski ,Fr(i, j))
Let T 0 = ∅
For round r = 1, . . . ,R:
For j = 1, . . . , `FPC :
Define the query qrj (i
′ , sk′) to be Dec(sk′ , cr(i′ , j)) if i′ < T r−1 and 0 otherwise
Let arj = O(x;qrj )
Let ar =
(
n
n−r
)
(ar1, . . . , a
r
`FPC
)
Let ir = FPC.Trace(Fr , ar ), and let T r = T r−1 ∪ {ir}
Figure 7: PrivacyAttackn,d[O]
As before, we introduce a related “ideal attack” for which we can show recovery succeeds.
Claim 5.4. For every oracle O, and every n,d ∈N
Pr
IdealPrivacyAttackn,d [O]

(
∀j ∈ [`FPC], r ∈ [R]
∣∣∣∣arj − qrj (x)∣∣∣∣ ≤ 1/300)
∧ (|x \ T R| > .01n)
 ≤ negl(n)
Proof. Fix any round r = 1, . . . ,R, let U = x \ T r−1. We will show that
Pr
Fr←RFPC.Gen(12n)

(
∀j ∈ [`FPC]
∣∣∣∣arj − qrj (x)∣∣∣∣ ≤ 1/300)
∧ (ir <U )∧ (∀r ′ < r, ir ′ ∈ x \ T r ′−1)
 ≤ negl(n)
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The set y:
Given parameters d,n, let R = .99n
Let λ be the largest integer such that `Enc(λ) + dlog2ne ≤ d
For i ∈ [2n], let ski ←R Gen(1λ) and let yi = (i, ski)
Choose a subsample x ⊆ y of size n
Recovery phase:
Setup fingerprinting codes and ciphertexts:
Let F1, . . . ,FR←R FPC.Gen(12n), let `FPC = `FPC(2n) be code length
For r = 1, . . . ,R, i ∈ x, j = 1, . . . , `FPC, let cr(i, j) = Enc(ski ,Fr(i, j))
For r = 1, . . . ,R, i < x, j = 1, . . . , `FPC, let cr(i, j) = Enc(ski ,0)
Let T 0 = ∅
For round r = 1, . . . ,R:
For j = 1, . . . , `FPC :
Define the query qrj (i
′ , sk′) to be Dec(sk′ , cr(i′ , j)) if i′ < T r−1 and 0 otherwise
Let arj = O(x;qrj )
Let ar =
(
n
n−r
)
(ar1, . . . , a
r
`FPC
)
Let ir = FPC.Trace(Fr , ar ), and let T r = T r−1 ∪ {ir}
Figure 8: IdealPrivacyAttackn,d[O]
By the security of the fingerprinting code, we have that for every U ⊆ [2n] and every algorithm
A, if ar ←R A(FU ), then
Pr
Fr←RFPC.Gen(12n)
[
(ar ∈ Con(FrU )∧ (FPC.Trace(Fr , ar ) <U )
]
≤ negl(n)
Now we need to show that(
∀r ′ < r, ir ′ ∈ x \ T r ′−1
)
∧ (∀j ∈ [`FPC] |arj − qrj (x)| ≤ 1/300) =⇒ ar ∈ Con(FrU ) (13)
Observe that, by construction
qrj (x) =
1
n
∑
i∈x
Dec(ski , c
r
j )
=
1
n
∑
i∈U
Dec(ski ,Enc(ski ,F
r(i, j))) +
1
n
∑
i<U
Dec(ski ,Enc(ski ,0))
=
1
n
∑
i∈U
Fr(i, j) (14)
Observe that if
∣∣∣∣arj − qrj (x)∣∣∣∣ ≤ 1/300 and for every r ′ < r, ir ′ ∈ x \ T r ′−1, then |T r | = r and |U | =
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|x \ T r | = n− r. In this case, we have∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
( n
n− r
)
arj −
1
|U |
∑
i∈U
Fr(i, j)
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
≤
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
( n
|U |
)
qrj −
1
|U |
∑
i∈U
Fr(i, j)
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣+
( n
n− r
)( 1
300
)
=
( n
n− r
)( 1
300
)
(14)
≤ 1
3
(r ≤ .99n)
So we conclude that if ar1, . . . , a
r
`FPC
are accurate to within 1/300, and for every r ′ < r, ir ′ ∈ x\T r ′−1,
then ar =
(
n
n−r
)
(ar1, . . . , a
r
`FPC
) is contained in Con(FrU ), which is precisely (13). Combining (13)
with the security of the fingerprinting code, we have
Pr
Fr←RFPC.Gen(12n)

(
∀j ∈ [`FPC]
∣∣∣∣arj − qrj (x)∣∣∣∣ ≤ 1/300)
∧ (ir <U )∧ (∀r ′ < r, ir ′ ∈ x \ T r ′−1)
 ≤ negl(n)
as desired.
To conclude the proof, we observe that
Pr
IdealPrivacyAttackn,d [O]

(
∀j ∈ [`FPC], r ∈ [R]
∣∣∣∣arj − qrj (x)∣∣∣∣ ≤ 1/300)
∧ (|x \ T R| > .01n)
 ≤ negl(n)
= Pr
IdealPrivacyAttackn,d [O]

(
∀j ∈ [`FPC], r ∈ [R]
∣∣∣∣arj − qrj (x)∣∣∣∣ ≤ 1/300)
∧ (∀r ∈ [R] ir ∈ x \ T r−1)
 ≤ negl(n)
≤ Pr
Fr←RFPC.Gen(12n)

(
∀j ∈ [`FPC]
∣∣∣∣arj − qrj (x)∣∣∣∣ ≤ 1/300)
∧ (ir <U )∧ (∀r ′ < r, ir ′ ∈ x \ T r ′−1)

≤ R ·negl(n) ≤ negl(n)
As we did in proving the lower bounds for answering adaptively chosen statistical queries,
we now claim that PrivacyAttack and IdealPrivacyAttack are computationally indistinguish-
able
Claim 5.5. Let Z be the event(
∀j ∈ [`FPC], r ∈ [R]
∣∣∣∣arj − qj(x)∣∣∣∣ ≤ 1/300)∧ (|x \ T R| > .01n)
Let (Gen,Enc,Dec) is a computationally secure encryption scheme with key length `Enc(λ) = λ and
n = n(d) be any polynomial. Then if O is computationally efficient,∣∣∣∣∣∣ PrPrivacyAttackn,d [O] [Z]− PrIdealPrivacyAttackn,d [O] [Z]
∣∣∣∣∣∣ = negl(d)
27
The analysis is essentially identical to what was shown in the proof of the lower bounds for
answering adaptively chosen statistical queries, so we omit the proof.
We can now combine these two claims to prove Theorem 5.3
Proof of Theorem 5.3. By combining Claim 5.4 and 5.5, we have
Pr
PrivacyAttackn,d [O]

(
∀j ∈ [`FPC], r ∈ [R]
∣∣∣∣arj − qj(x)∣∣∣∣ ≤ 1/300)
∧ (|x \ T R| > .01n)
 ≤ negl(n)
If O is α-accurate, then
Pr
PrivacyAttackn,d [O]
[
∀j ∈ [`FPC], r ∈ [R]
∣∣∣∣arj − qj(x)∣∣∣∣ ≤ 1/300] ≥ 1− on(1)
therefore
Pr
PrivacyAttackn,d [O]
[
|x \ T R| > .01n
]
≥ 1− on(1)
Since |x \ T R| ≤ .01n, and |T R| ≤ .99n implies |T R4x| ≤ .01n, we have
Pr
PrivacyAttackn,d [O]
[
|T R4x| > .01n
]
≤ on(1)
This completes the proof.
As we did in Section 4.6, we can prove an information-theoretic analogue of our hardness
result for avoiding blatant non-privacy.
Theorem 5.6. Giving accurate answers to n3+o(1) adaptively chosen queries on n samples of dimen-
sion d = n3+o(1) is blatantly non-private for unbounded oracles.
The proof is essentially identical to what is sketched in Section 4.6.
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A Security reductions from Section 4
In Sections 4.3 and 4.4 we made several claims comparing the probability of events in Attack to
the probability of events in IdealAttack. Each of these claims follow from the assumed security
of the encryption scheme. In this section we restate and prove these claims. Since the claims
are all of a similar nature, the proof will be somewhat modular.
Before we begin recall the formal definition of security of an encryption scheme. Security
is defined via a pair of oracles E0 and E1. E1(sk1, . . . , skp, ·) takes as input the index of a key
i ∈ [p] and a message m and returns Enc(ski ,m), whereas E0(sk1, . . . , skp, ·) takes the same input
but returns Enc(ski ,0). The security of the encryption scheme asserts that for randomly chosen
secret keys, no computationally efficient adversary can tell whether or not it is interacting with
E0 or E1.
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Definition A.1. An encryption scheme (Gen,Enc,Dec) is secure if for every polynomial p = p(λ),
and every poly(λ)-time adversary B, if sk1, . . . , skp←R Gen(1λ)∣∣∣∣Pr [BE0(sk1,...,skp ,·) = 1]−Pr [BE1(sk1,...,skp ,·) = 1]∣∣∣∣ = negl(λ)
Claim A.2 (Claim 4.2 Restated). Let Z1 be the event
∀r ∈ [R], for .99`FPC choices of j ∈ [`FPC],
∣∣∣∣∣O(x,qrj )− Ei∈S\T r−1 [Fr(i, j)]
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ 1/3
Let (Gen,Enc,Dec) is a computationally secure encryption scheme with key length `Enc(λ) = λ and
n = n(d) be any polynomial. Then if O is computationally efficient,∣∣∣∣∣∣ PrIdealAttackn,d [O] [Z1]− PrAttackn,d [O] [Z1]
∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ negl(d)
Claim A.3 (Claim 4.5 Restated). Let Z2 be the event
{
|S \ T R| ≤ 500
}
Let (Gen,Enc,Dec) is a com-
putationally secure encryption scheme with key length `Enc(λ) = λ and n = n(d) be any polynomial.
Then if O is computationally efficient,∣∣∣∣∣∣ PrIdealAttackn,d [O] [Z2]− PrAttackn,d [O] [Z2]
∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ negl(d)
Claim A.4 (Claim 4.9 Restated). Let Z3 be the event
(|S \ T R| ≤ 500)∧ |O(x,q∗)− q∗(D)| ≤ 1
2000
Let (Gen,Enc,Dec) is a computationally secure encryption scheme with key length `Enc(λ) = λ and
n = n(d) be any polynomial. Then if O is computationally efficient,∣∣∣∣∣∣ PrIdealAttackn,d [O] [Z3]− PrAttackn,d [O] [Z3]
∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ negl(d)
To prove each of these claims c ∈ {1,2,3}, we construct an adversary Bc that will attempt to
use O to break the security of the encryption. We construct Bc in such a way that its advan-
tage in breaking the security of encryption is precisely the difference in the probability of the
event Zc between Attack and IdealAttack, which implies that the difference in probabilities is
negligible. The simulator is given in Figure 9
Proof of Claims A.2, A.3, A.4. First, observe that for c ∈ {1,2,3}, Bc is computationally efficient
as long as FPC.Gen,FPC.Trace, and O are all computationally efficient. Efficiency of FPC.Gen
and FPC.Trace will be satisfied by the construction in Theorem 2.3 and efficiency of O is by
assumption of the claim. Also notice B can determine whether Zc has occurred efficiently.
Now we observe that when the oracle is E1 (the oracle that takes as input i andm and returns
Enc(ski ,m)), and sk1, . . . , skp are chosen randomly from Gen(1λ), then the view of the oracle is
identical to Attackn,d[O]. Specifically, the oracle holds a random sample of pairs (i, ski) and
is shown queries that are encryptions either under keys it knows or random unknown keys.
Moreover, the messages being encrypted are chosen from the same distribution. On the other
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Simulate constructing and sampling from D:
Given parameters d,n, let p = 2000n, let R = n− 500
Let λ be the largest integer such that `Enc(λ) + dlogpe ≤ d
Sample users u1, . . . ,un←R [p], let S be the set of unique users in the sample
Choose new keys ski ←R Gen(1λ) for i ∈ S
For i ∈ n, let xi = (ui , skui ), let x = (x1, . . . ,xn)
Simulate the recovery phase:
Setup fingerprinting codes and ciphertexts:
Let F1, . . . ,FR←R FPC.Gen(1p), let `FPC = `FPC(p) be code length
For r = 1, . . . ,R, i = 1, . . . ,p, j = 1, . . . , `FPC
If i ∈ S let cr(i, j) = Enc(ski ,Fr(i, j)), otherwise ask E for an encryption
of Fr(i, j) under key ski , that is cr(i, j) = Eb(sk1, . . . , skp, i,Fr(i, j))
Let T 0 = ∅. For round r = 1, . . . ,R:
For j = 1, . . . , `FPC :
Define the query qrj (i
′ , sk′) to be Dec(sk′ , cr(i′ , j)) if i′ < T r−1 and 0 otherwise
Let arj = O(x;qrj )
Let ar = (ar1, . . . , a
r
`FPC
), let ir = FPC.Trace(Fr , ar ), and let T r = T r−1 ∪ {ir}
Attack phase:
Let φ = 0 with probability 1/2 and φ = 1/500 with probability 1/2
Sample a random subset B ⊆ [p] of size φ · p.
Let mi = 1 for all i ∈ B and 0 for all i ∈ [p] \B
For each i ∈ S, let c∗i = Enc(ski ,mi), for each i ∈ [p] \ S, ask E for an encryption
of mi under key ski , that is c∗i = Eb(sk1, . . . , skp, i,mi)
Define the query q∗(i′ , sk′) to be Dec(sk′ , c∗i′ ) if i′ < T R and 0 otherwise
Let a∗ = O(x,q∗)
Output 1 if and only if the event Zc occurs
Figure 9: BEb(sk1,...,skp ,·)c,n,d
hand, when the oracle is E0 (the oracle that takes as input i and c and returns Enc(ski ,0)), then
the view of the oracle is identical to Attackn,d[O]. Thus we have that for c ∈ {1,2,3},∣∣∣∣∣∣ PrIdealAttackn,d [O] [Zc]− PrAttackn,d [O] [Zc]
∣∣∣∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ Prsk1,...,skp←RGen(1λ)
[
BE0(sk1,...,skp ,·)c,n,d = 1
]
− Pr
sk1,...,skp←RGen(1λ)
[
BE1(sk1,...,skp ,·)c,n,d = 1
]∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
= negl(λ) = negl(d)
The last equality holds because we have chosen p = 2000n(d) = poly(d), and therefore we have
λ = d − dlogpe = d −O(logd). This completes the proof of all three claims.
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